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CASE COMMENT
THE THIN DIVIDE: BUSINESS MODEL, PATENTABLE
PROCESS OR UNPATENTABLE PRINCIPLE?
In Re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
Eric Feld

I. FACTS
Applicants Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw filed a patent
application to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office' for a new business
model which involved hedging the price risk in the sale and purchase of
commodities.2 The patent office examiner rejected the application 3
stating that the proposed model did not satisfy the criteria of the Patent
Act, 4 specifically the business model did not constitute a "process"
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 5 In rejecting the application, the examiner stated
that the process was not patentable because it was not tied to a specific
* Eric Feld is a J.D. Candidate 2011 at the University of Florida Levin College of Law.
He would like to thank the Journalof Technology Law & Policy for this opportunity.
1. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub. nom. Bilski v.
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
2. Id. The proposed process utilized mathematical models to curb risk between buyers
and sellers of a commodity by using an intermediary agent to purchase and sell the commodity
at fixed prices to minimize the negative effects of demand spikes. Id. at 949-50. For example,
when demand for a commodity rises, consequently the price rises, which benefits the seller of a
commodity while detrimentally affecting the buyer. Id. at 950. Conversely, when demand for
the commodity falls, the price drops which benefits the buyer of the commodity while hindering
the seller. Id. Inconsistent demand patterns can then make it difficult for buyers and sellers to
consistently predict cost outlooks. An intermediary which buys the commodity from the seller at
one fixed price and then sells it to a buyer at a different fixed price isolates the buyers and
sellers from risk by maintaining a consistent price which can be used to ultimately create steady
income. The intermediary maintains its own profitability by recovering any profit lost by
purchasing the commodity at a disadvantageous price in relation to the market price by selling it
at an advantageous price relative to the market price and vice versa. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950.
3. Ex parte Bilski, App. No., 2002-2257, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, at *1 (B.P.A. 1,
2006) [hereinafter BoardDecision].
4. Id. at *2. The Patent Act of 1793 established the guidelines for patent eligibility.
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952 n.4. To meet the threshold requirement of patent eligibility, a proposed
patent must be considered either a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter as
codified under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 951.
5. Board Decision, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, at 4-5. 35 U.S.C. § 101 states that
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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apparatus and merely manipulated an abstract idea. Applicants
appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board)
which upheld the rejection of the patent application.7 Applicants timely
appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which heard the case en banc.8 The Court HELD that the applicant's
proposed method was not a patent-eligible process under 35 U.S.C. §
101 because it constituted an abstract model which neither transformed
an object into a different state or thing nor used a specific machine to
carry out its function under the "machine or transformation test" set out
by the Supreme Court. 9
II. HISTORY
In Gottschalk v. Benson, an applicant attempted to patent a computer
algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) format to pure
binary format on a computer.'o In its discussion of patent eligible
processes, the Supreme Court made clear that one cannot patent merely
an abstract "idea," such as a mathematical algorithm." Further
expanding on this concept, the Court held that natural scientific
phenomena and mental processes cannot be patented. 12 However, the
use of the phenomena in a s8ecific application to obtain a new and
useful end may be patentable. The Court in Benson explained that the
"transformation and reduction of an article to a different state or thing is
the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include
particular machines."l 4 The Court further concluded that a process
6. Board Decision, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, at 3. In rejecting the patent application,
the examiner used the "technological arts" test which guides that to be considered a "process"
under the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101, the model must be tied to a specific physical apparatus,
rather than being a model which represents a fundamental idea. Id. at *34.
7. Id. at *80. The Board stated that the patent office examiner incorrectly utilized the
"technological arts" test which requires a process be used to develop a machine or improve
human efficiency in some respect because the case law does not support such a test. Id. at *41 42. The Board labeled the requirement of a specific apparatus erroneous because a process that
does not use a specific apparatus can be patent-eligible if it transforms an object into a different
state or thing. Id. at *41-42. However, the Board said that the applicants' claims do not involve
any patent-eligible transformation, holding that transformation of "non-physical financial risks
and legal liabilities of the commodity provider, the consumer, and the market participants" is not
patent-eligible subject matter. Id. at *52-53.
8. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950.
9. Id. at 966.
10. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
11. Id. at 71.
12. Id. at 67.

13. Id.
14. Id. at 70.

2010]1

CASE COMMEfNT

115

patent's ability to preclude the entire use of a mathematical algorithm
was a key indication of its ineligibility under section 101 of the Patent
Act." In Benson, since the mathematical formula used in the process
had no other practical application than for the specific purpose
presented, then granting the patent would have the practical effect of
precluding the use of the mathematical algorithm itself.16 Concluding
then that ideas and natural mathematical functions are not patent
eligible,' 7 the Supreme Court rejected the application.' 8
In a subsequent case, Parkerv. Flook, the Supreme Court once again
distinguished between patent-eligible "processes" and patent-ineligible
"principles."' 9 In Flook, an individual submitted a patent application for
a process using a mathematical algorithm to update "alarm limits"
which signaled problems in various oil refining manufacturing
settings. 20 Utilizing "alarm limits" was not a new idea, and the only
novel feature of the applicant's patent was the use of the mathematical
algorithm to continuously update the limits. 2 1 In attempting to
fundamentally distinguish the patent from the process in Benson, the
applicant Flook stated that the process was not preempting the use of
the mathematical algorithm entirely, but only its specific application in
oil refining activities.22 While the Supreme Court recognized once again
that a process containing a mathematical theorem to achieve a desired
purposed could be patented, 23 it stated that "post-solution activities" as
Flook demonstrated could not artfully transform an otherwise unpatentable principle into a patent eligible process.2 4 The Court noted
that a competent draftsman could artificially manipulate the patent
system by attaching a simple application to a mathematical formula.2 5
15. Id. at 71.
16. Id. at 71-72. The applied patent had a preclusive effect because as described, the
patent sought to enjoin the use of the algorithm on any computer, when the algorithm was only
useful in computer settings. Id. at 71.
17. Id. at 67.
18. Id. at 73.
19. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
20. Id. at 585-87.
21. Id. at 585-86.
22. Id. at 589-90.
23. Id. at 591. "While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific
truth may be." Id. (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94
(1939)).
24. Id. at 590. Post solution activities are simple applications of a mathematical principle
to assist in solving a problem. These activities are not patent eligible because they merely point
out the fundamental given use for the principle. Id.
25. Id. The Court expressed its concern that an applicant could patent the mathematical
Pythagorean Theorem by simply stating that when solved, the theorem is useful in surveying
activities. Id.

1 16

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW & POLICY

[Vol. I15

The Court further explained that the proposed patent did not have
enough specific limitations or guidelines to suggest exactly how it
would be utilized and thus was not reduced to a specific a lication.6
The Court, in its desire to preserve the limits of patent law, denied the
28
applicant's patent.
Finally in Diamond v. Diehr, an individual applied for a patent for a
process of curing rubber which heavily relied on mathematical
algorithms to achieve the desired result.29 According to the application,
the process for properly curing rubber was highly dependent on
controlling the temperature while heating the rubber.M The applicant's
process implemented a mathematical algorithm to ensure that the rubber
was consistently heated to the correct temperature for an optimal period
of time. 3 1 In holding that the process was patent eligible, the Supreme
Court stated that the procedure, although heavily relying on
mathematical formulas, did not seek to patent the formulas
themselves. 32 Rather, the procedure protected the integration of the
algorithms in creating a process as a whole which the patent laws were
"designed to protect."33 The Court in Diehr established the "machine or
transformation test" by stating that a process is considered patent
eligible if it either transforms an object into a different state or thing, or
if it operates on a specifically defined machine. 34
When analyzed congruently, Benson, Flook, and Diehr establish the
"machine or transformation" test which crafts guidelines on which
processes are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. A mere "idea" or
principle is clearly not patentable, but the implementation of the idea
into a process as a whole can be patent eligible.

26. See id. at 586.
27. Id. at 596 ("[W]e must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights
into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress.").
28. Id.
29. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1981).
30. Id. at 177.
31. Id. at 178.
32. Id. at 193.
33. Id. at 192. "Because we do not view respondents' claims as an attempt to patent a
mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber
products, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals." Id. at 192-93.
Further, unlike in Flook, the applicants were not attempting to preclude the use of the
mathematical algorithm in all applications; rather they were trying to protect the use of the
algorithm in conjunction with all of these additional necessary steps in curing the rubber. Id. at
187.
34. Id. at 184.
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IHI. INSTANT CASE

In the instant case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
closely followed the precedent set forth by the three primary Supreme
Court cases previously discussed. The Court of Appeals utilized the
"machine or transformation test" as the primary benchmark for
determining whether a process is patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. §
101. 35 In its explanation of the "machine or transformation test," the
Court held that an applicant may establish that a process satisfies § 101
by either showing that the claim is tied to a particular machine, or by
showing that the claimed process transforms an article into a different
object or thing.3 6
Since the Applicants openly conceded that their process was not tied
to a particular machine, 3 the Court focused its analysis primarily on
determining whether the claimed process necessarily transformed an
article into a different state or thing. 38 While the Court recognized that
activities such as dying fabrics, or molding rubber clearly transforms an
article, the Court commented that dealing with abstract business models
and transformation was more difficult. 3 The Court, however, did not
put a categorical exclusion on the patentability of business models 40 and
stated that "physical steps" were not necessary to deem a process
patentable. 4 1 Ultimately though, the Court found that the process for
hedging risk constituted merely an intangible conceptual exchange of
rights and privileges in the purchase and sale of a certain commodity.42
Consequently, the Court held that the model for hedging risk did "not
35. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub. nom. Bilski v.
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2733 (2009). "[Tlhe machine-or-transformation test, properly applied, is the
governing test for determining patent eligibility of a process under § 101." Id.
36. Id. at 961.
37. Id. at 962.
38. Id.
39. Id. The Court recognizes the changes in technology that have arisen since precedential
Supreme Court cases such as computer programs, where the "changes" to an object can be
entirely electronic and not necessarily "physical" in the traditional understanding of the word.
Id.
40. Id. at 960. The Court states there is no categorical exclusion beyond that specified in
previous Supreme Court cases, and that business model processes are patent eligible under the
"machine or transformation test" just like every other process. Id. A process is not patent
eligible merely because it states physical steps but does not employ a particular machine, nor
transfers an article into a different state or thing. Id. at 961. On the other hand, a process that
states no apparent physical steps, but still transforms an article into a different state or thing or
utilizes a particular machine, is patent eligible. Id.
41. Id. ("Thus, the proper inquiry under § 101 is not whether the process claim recites
sufficient physical steps, but rather whether the claim meets the machine-or-transformation
test.").
42. Id. at 964.
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involve the transformation of any physical object or substance, or an
electronic signal representative of any physical object or substance"43
and thus was not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101."

IV. ANALYSIS
Throughout the Circuit Court's analysis of precedent cases and the
recognition of current evolutions in technology, its struggle to define the
thin line between patentable "processes" and un-patentable "principles"
underscores the aging effectiveness of current tests under the Patent
Act. Although the Court ultimately uses the "machine or transformation
test,"45 this test merely relegates the applicants' business risk model as
non-patent eligible, while doing little to describe how courts should rule
on the patentability of future innovations, which are largely
electronically and conceptually based.
In Benson, the Supreme Court held that when a mental principle or
mathematical algorithm is implemented into a process where granting a
patent would preempt all uses of the principle, a patent cannot be
granted because the effect would be granting a limitation on the
principle itself.46 Recognizing the potential for loopholes in patent
applications by associating a simple process with a mental principle, the
Supreme Court in Diehr held that applying a field of use limitation47 to
a process would not render an otherwise patent-ineligible process
patentable.4 8 The Circuit Court in the instant case attempted to reconcile
this apparent conflict49 by saying that a patent on a process which preempts the widespread use of a fundamental principle merely illustrates
that the patent is reduced to being effective on the principle itself5 o and
conversely a process which passes the "machine or transformation test"
43. Id. "Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public or private legal
obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the test
because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are not representative of physical
objects or substances." Id. at 963.
44. Id. at 966.
45. Id. at 956.
46. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
47. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981). "A mathematical formula does not
suddenly become patentable subject matter simply by having the applicant acquiesce to limiting
the reach of the patent for the formula to a particular technological use." Id.
48. Id.
49. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957. The Court wanted to reconcile the apparent conflict that on
one hand patent law requires the applicant to limit the patent to protecting the use of the mental
principle in a specific application and then on the other hand saying that once implemented into
a specific application, the application cannot be a trivial device used to mask an attempt to
protect the principle itself. See id.
50. Id.
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does not face this problem. 5 ' However, this explanation fails to assess a
situation where a fundamental principle is first discovered and then
subsequently applied to a specific application. Although it may pass the
"machine or transformation" test, the patent would still fail eligibility
based on the Benson pre-emption principle as explained by the instant
court.52 Because there have been no other discovered uses for the
principle, the patent would necessarily prevent all uses of it.
In Flook, the Court addressed the risk of allowing patents where an
applicant artfully attached a post-solution activity activity to a process.53
However, the Supreme Court, as well as the instant court, fails to
address a situation where a process simultaneously uses a mental
principle to achieve a legitimate transformation of an object, yet the
principle involved has no other useful applications. The "machine or
transformation" test as understood with the "field of use limitations"
and "post-solution activity" elements would seemingly require at least
two known applications of a fundamental principle before a patent
eligible process can successfully implement the newly discovered
principle in any fashion.
Furthermore, while the Court in the instant case held that a process
can satisfy the "machine or transformation" test by implementing a
specific machine, it does little to clarify how this definition will apply in
the future. Many new patents are based on software which inherently
uses the "machine" of an electronic device.5 4 Consequently, the instant
court recognizes that the Supreme Court ma' abandon or modify the
''machine or transformation test" in the future.
Additionally, although the instant court relies singularly on the
"machine or transformation test" to reach its holding, it is not clear
51. Id.
52. The Benson pre-emption principle states that when a process patent pre-empts the use
of a fundamental principle, then the patent cannot be granted. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 71-72 (1972). The instant court understands that in Benson, the patent failed because
although limited to its use on a computer, the algorithm could only be implemented on a
computer, so the limitation would have been effective in preventing the widespread pre-emption
of the algorithm. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955 n.9.
53. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
54. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956. "Nevertheless, we agree that future developments in
technology and the sciences may present difficult challenges to the machine-or-transformation
test, just as the widespread use of computers and the advent of the Internet has begun to
challenge it in the past decade." Id. "We leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise
contours of machine implementation, as well as the answers to particular questions, such as
whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular
machine." Id. at 962.
55. Id. at 956. "Thus, we recognize that the Supreme Court may ultimately decide to alter
or perhaps even set aside this test to accommodate emerging technologies." Id.
56. Id. "[T]he machine-or-transformation test, properly applied, is the governing test for
determining patent eligibility of a process under § 101." Id.
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that the Supreme Court requires this test in a § 101 threshold analysis.5 7
Rather, the instant court's justification in utilizing the test further
underscores the difficulty in crafting a reliable rule for patent
eligibility.58
In Benson, Flook, and Diehr,the Supreme Court suggested but never
expressly stated that a claimed process must either be implemented
through a particular machine, or transform a particular object into
something else. 59 Moreover, in Benson, the Supreme Court specifically
stated that it did not absolutely require that a patent process be tied to a
particular machine, or represent a transformation of an object.6 0
Additionally, in Flook, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this notion by
supporting its holding in Benson that a process need not be strictly tied
to a machine or represent a transformation.6 ' Finally, the Supreme Court
in Diehr did not expressly apply the "machine or transformation test,"
focusing instead on analyzing whether the proposed process amounted
to an attempt to patent a mathematical formula. 62 The specific
discussion of the "machine or transformation test" was unnecessary to
the Supreme Court's discussion because of the relative obviousness of a
57. See id. at 979 (Newman, J., dissenting) (commenting that the Court in Benson
specifically stated that it did not hold that there would be no situation where a patent could not
be eligible if it did not pass the machine or transformation test).
58. Id. at 956 (majority opinion). The instant court in response to several amicus
recognizes that Benson specifically states that the Supreme Court does not require that a valid
process patent meet the "machine or transformation test." See id. at 956. "Applicants and several
amicis have argued that the Supreme Court did not intend the machine-or-transformation test to
be the sole test governing § 101 analyses." Id. at 955.
59. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 584, 595
n.18 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981).
60. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a "different state or
thing." We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not
meet the requirements of our prior precedents.
Id. (emphasis added).
61. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 n.9.
The statutory definition of "process" is broad.... An argument can be made,
however, that this Court has only recognized a process as within the statutory
definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change
materials to a "different state or thing." . . . As in Benson, we assume that a
valid process patent may issue even if it does not meet one of these
qualifications of our earlier precedents.
Id.
62. Diehr,450 U.S. at 192-93.
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transformation of an object through the manufacture of rubber. 63 The
Diehr Court instead distinguished the case from precedent under the
guidance of Benson by explaining that the proposed patent would only
preclude the use of the mathematical formula in its specific
manifestation, rather than the use of the formula in every application.
In the instant case, the Court largely disregarded these caveats by
relying on the statement affirmed by the Supreme Court that the
transformation and reduction of an article to a different state or thing "is
the clue" to the patentability of a process claim that does not include
particular machines.6 5 The Circuit Court interestingly relied on the
semantic distinction where the Supreme Court utilized the language "the
clue" rather than "a clue." 66
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout the instant case, it is clear that the "machine or
transformation" test has a number of ambiguities and limitations. The
difficulty in explaining the difference between patentable processes and
un-patentable principles illustrates the likelihood that future innovations
will face increasingly complex questions with conceptual concepts.
Furthermore, the Court's holding may have spurred more questions than
answers. Although the Circuit Court may have ultimately reached the
correct ruling, it is not clear that its strict requirement of the "machine
or transformation" test stands in line with Supreme Court precedent
which suggests that the test is a useful tool, but not strictly required. It is
63. Id. at 184. The Supreme Court in Diehr focused on whether the use of the
mathematical formula utilized in the process of curing rubber precluded the use of the formula
in other applications. Id. at 191. Rather than implementing "machine or transformation test," the
Diehr Court focused on the applicant's attempt to patent the process as a whole which
constituted the use of the mathematical formula when used in conjunction with all of the other
necessary steps to create the rubber. Id. at 191-92.
64. Id. at 192-93.
65. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
66. In re Bilski, 545 U.S. F.3d 943, 956 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, Bilski v.
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
We believe that the Supreme Court spoke of the machine-or-transformation test
as the "clue" to patent-eligibility because the test is the tool used to determine
whether a claim is drawn to a statutory "process" the statute does not itself
explicitly mention machine implementation or transformation. We do not
consider the word "clue" to indicate that the machine-or-implementation test is
optional or merely advisory. Rather, the Court described it as the clue, not
merely "a" clue.
Id.
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SUPREME COURT

At the time of this publication, the petitioners have appealed the
D.C. Circuit Court's ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court. On June 1, 2009,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the case, Bilski v. Kappos, and
heard oral arguments on November 9, 2009. During Oral Arguments,
the Court seemed receptive to the idea that the Circuit Courts'
application of the "machine or transformation test" may have been too
strict, but nevertheless implied that the machine or transformation test
supplies valuable limits in construing what constitutes a patent eligible
process. Although the D.C. Circuit did not wish to put a categorical
exclusion on business model patents, the Supreme Court suggested that
without the use of a specific machine, business models, regardless of
their transformation abilities, may not receive patent protection.7o
Furthermore, the Court suggested that even if it utilizes the machine or
transformation test, it fails to see how the business model would satisfy
this test. The model appears to represent an abstract idea which is only
loosely tied to physical activities; such as buyers and sellers making
phone calls to each other to carry out a transaction.

67. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
68. Transcript of Oral Argument, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, oral arguments, (U.S.
Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral arguments/argument-transcripts/08964.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 7-13 (noting the lack of business model patent protection in other countries).
71. See id. at 51-53.

